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There were two important movements in conservative and
libertarian legal thought in the latter part of the twentieth century. One was law and economics. The other was originalism.
Judge Robert Bork was unique in being at the intellectual center
of both of them. In law and economics, he applied economic
analysis in book-length form to antitrust law, showing how the
simple insights of price theory could generate a fully coherent
body of legal doctrine., In constitutional theory, he made a crucial first step toward originalism by arguing that neutral principles must be derived neutrally and thus from the text of the
Constitution.2 As a result of these distinct enterprises, he was
the most important legal scholar on the right in the last fifty
years.
These contributions were of substantially different kinds. In
antitrust, he mapped an entire field. In constitutional law, he
discovered or rediscovered a methodology but left it to others to
reticulate and refine his insight. While some have suggested
that his claim to being a great scholar rests only on his contribution to antitrust,3 this assessment is mistaken. The pathfinder
can be as great as even the most expert surveyor. 4 Both are crucial to the progress of any discipline.
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1 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with
Itself 116-33 (Basic Books 1978).
2
See, for example, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 7-8 (1971).
3 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Remembering Bork: He Was My Teacher 30
Years Ago. I've Spent My Career Proving Him Wrong., Slate (Dec 20, 2012), online at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2012/12/robert bork s de
athlearning from him-and proving-him wrong.html (visited Oct 17, 2013).
4
My friend and coauthor Professor Michael Rappaport similarly identifies him as
a pathbreaker. See Mike Rappaport, Judge Robert Bork: Pathbreaker,Liberty Law Blog
(Library of Law and Liberty Dec 23, 2012), online at http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012
/12/23/judge-robert-bork-pathbreaker (visited Oct 24, 2013).
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Because his career of public controversy centered on constitutional law, Bork's obituaries did not much emphasize his law
and economics work. The New York Times devoted only a paragraph to his antitrust contributions, ending it dismissively with
the comment that "[s]tudents called a course he taught on the
topic at Yale 'protrust."'5 But Bork was the most important figure in antitrust law in his time. His book, The Antitrust Paradox,6 was an enormous milestone not only in antitrust but in law
and economics generally.
To be sure, Bork was not the originator of the law-andeconomics analysis of antitrust law. That analysis had begun in
a course at the University of Chicago, where the economist Aaron Director argued with law professor Edward Levi. Although
Director led only every fifth class, he persuaded Bork the student of the virtues of his approach not only in antitrust, but in
social policy more generally. Director, recalled Bork, "destroyed
my dreams of socialism with price theory."7
But Bork took these economic ideas and married them to a
lawyer's gimlet eye for dissecting case law to produce a book
that offered a devastating critique of decades of Supreme Court
decisions. He discussed all the important areas of antitrustmonopoly, mergers, horizontal agreements, and vertical agreements. In each area he explained in clear language how simple
economic analysis could transform antitrust law, improving the
welfare of consumers.
He had a descriptive flair that could capture the attention
even of the lawyer unschooled in the dismal science. In Fortner
Enterprises, Inc v United States Steel Corp,8 the real estate developer Fortner had a dispute with United States Steel Company, which had loaned Fortner money to buy land on the condition that Fortner purchase and erect upon the land
prefabricated houses built by United States Steel.9 Fortner sued,
alleging that United States Steel had illegally tied its loans to
the sale of its houses.10 But, as Bork later pointed out, this claim
was backwards, since United States Steel was trying to sell
5 Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate Afire,
NY Times Al (Dec 20, 2012).
6
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (cited in note 1).
7
Douglas Martin, Aaron Director,Economist, Dies at 102, NY Times B10 (Sept 16,
2004).
8
394 US 495 (1969).
9 Id at 496-97.
10 Id.
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houses and offering very good terms to achieve this goal." But
the Supreme Court nevertheless said that United States Steel
had "a unique economic ability to provide 100% financing at
cheap rates," entitling Fortner to a jury trial on whether the
houses were illegally tied to financing.12 fork summed up: "The
effective holding of the case is that Fortner was getting credit
terms more favorable than he could get elsewhere and was entitled to prove it in order to recover triple damages."13 A sentence
of quotable ridicule is worth a page of economic models in transforming the law.
And change the antitrust law he did, so much so that now it
very largely resembles the recommendations and analysis Bork
sets out in The Antitrust Paradox.To take just a few examples:
After his criticism of United States u Topco Associates,14 the
Court now considers productive efficiencies even in the context
of horizontal agreements among competitors.i5 After his evisceration of many merger cases brought by the government, the Justice Department and FTC revised guidelines attempting to assess the costs and benefits of mergers in a more economically
sophisticated fashion.16 And finally, in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc,17 the Court, citing Bork multiple
times,18 ended its per se prohibition on retail price maintenance,
a doctrine that had stood for almost a hundred years.19 Manufacturers are now permitted to strike price agreements with distributors, allowing them to find a structure of distribution for
delivering their product with the lowest possible cost. In the absence of market power, the manufacturer in this respect is now
rightly regarded as the customer's BFF.

11

See Bork, The Antitrust Paradoxat 368-69 (cited in note 1).
FortnerEnterprises,394 US at 505-06.
13 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 369 (cited in note 1).
14 405 US 596 (1972).
15 See, for example, BroadcastMusic, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc,
441 US 1, 19-21 (1979).
16 The key change came in the 1984 guidelines. See generally US Department of
Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines (1984), online at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger
/11249.htm (visited Oct 26, 2013). The guidelines have since been revised, but they are
largely continuous with the 1984 guidelines. See generally US Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug 19, 2010), online
at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (visited Oct 26, 2013).
17 551 US 877 (2007).
18 See id at 889, 897.
19 While the per se rule on vertical agreements had been weakened, the rule
against price maintenance announced in Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons
Co, 220 US 373 (1911), had held sway since 1911.
12
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Disagreement on particular antitrust cases, of course, continues, but the disagreements take place in the legal landscape
that was in large measure created by The Antitrust Paradox.I
would analogize Judge Bork here to the most successful kind of
statesman-one who, like Margaret Thatcher, transforms the
opposition by creating new terms of debate.
Bork is, of course, even more famous for originalism. Here
he did not provide a comprehensive reordering of his field, but
he nevertheless created a historic inflection point for constitutional interpretation in a single famous article, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems.20 He did so by offering a new solution to some of the principal old problems that
scholars were confronting at the time. High on that list of such
issues were the countermajoritarian difficulty and "neutral principles."21 The countermajoritarian difficulty is raised when the
unelected Supreme Court invalidates legislation that is enacted
by a contemporary majority.22 Deciding cases according to neutral principles is what constrains the judge from rendering
judgments based on his or her own preferences.23
For Bork, the solution to these problems was interconnected. While he agreed that most decisions were left to popular majorities, he acknowledged that minority rights were to be protected as well. But neither the minority nor majority could be
entrusted with determining the appropriate boundaries of the
other's rights, because each has an incentive to set them in its
own interest. 24 Thus, only something extrinsic to their will-the
text of the Constitution-could generate the proper guideposts.
Similarly, neutral principles by themselves are not sufficient to
constrain judicial discretion, because judges would still have discretion to decide which principles to follow. The neutral princi-

ples had to be neutrally derived, and that also pointed to deriving the principles from the text of the Constitution.25
Bork's excursion as a scholarly pioneer in this field was brief
and necessarily left many issues unanswered. Indeed, while it is
clear that he was speaking of the historical understanding of the
20 Bork, 47 Ind L J 1 (cited in note 2).
21 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 Harv L
Rev 1, 19 (1959).
22 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 16-17 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
23 See Bork, 47 Ind L J at 7-8 (cited in note 2).
24 See id at 3.
25 See id at 7.
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constitutional text, he never even used the term "originalism" in
this famous article. Even subsequently, he did not provide substantial scholarship on important questions of methodologylike whether originalism is best understood through original intent or original public meaning-or describe in substantial detail the proper relation between originalism and precedent.
Many others have provided justifications for originalism that
may prove more compelling than his and less connected to the
peculiar constitutional problems that dominated his day.26
But further articulation and disagreement are the fruits of
scholarly success, not evidence of inadequacy. Bork opened up a
new world, or at least rediscovered an old one. Those who came
afterwards naturally created new maps, filling in important details of the terrain and not infrequently disagreeing with the
boundaries he drew. But the scholarship attendant on any idea
is necessarily fractal in nature. Making a better map always
leaves room for better maps to come.
A measure of the importance of his contribution is to consider conservatism in constitutional law before and after his salient
contribution. Before Bork, the quintessential conservative was
Justice John Marshall Harlan 11.27 His views on constitutional
law certainly differed from those of his colleagues on the Warren
Court, but his jurisprudence was not founded on wholly different
principles. For instance, in Griswold u Connecticut,28 he concurred in the invalidation of the Connecticut law,29 Joining in
substantive due process and embracing an expansive role for the
Court in overturning legislation without explaining how this

26 The justifications offered for following the original meaning are now quite varied.
Professor Randy Barnett argues that original meaning is likely to lead to just results as
defined in the classical liberal tradition. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 100-09 (Princeton 2004). Professor Keith Whittington argues that originalism is justified by an appeal to the sovereignty of the people in
creating the Constitution. See Keith E. Whittington, ConstitutionalInterpretation: Textual Meaning, OriginalIntent, and JudicialReview 152-59 (Kansas 1999). Michael Rappaport and I argue that originalism is justified because strict supermajoritarian rules
embodied in the making and amending of our Constitution are likely to lead to good results and more likely to do so than other methods of constitution making. See John 0.
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution 1-3 (Harvard 2013).
27 See Jeff Brown, The Platonic Guardianand the Lawyer's Judge: Contrastingthe
JudicialPhilosophies of Earl Warren and John M. Harlan, 44 Houston L Rev 253, 28283 (2007).
28 381 US 479 (1965).
29 Id at 499-502 (Harlan concurring).
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was justified by the text of the Constitution.30 To be sure, he was
far more cautious than the majority opinion in his analysis,31
and suggested that the right to contraception does not extend
outside marriage.32 But this opinion cannot be considered
originalist, in that it does not seek to locate its rules of decision
in the most plausible reading of the text of the Constitution. As
a result, it may be said that, before Bork, conservative thought
lacked a clear method of interpretation. As such, it tended to
fight at best a rearguard action against progressive legal
thought, criticizing progressive decisions but retreating under
the advance of the precedents that progressives created.
But originalism provided resources for an offensive strategy.
For instance, it is not that there is unanimity on such questions
of whether the Constitution includes the right to contraception,
but there is very substantial agreement that any right to contraception must be encompassed within the original meaning of
some portion of the Constitution's text. There is also an insistence that precedent, however powerful (and originalists do not
yet agree on its weight in adjudication), does not have the generative and regenerative force of text. Thus, Bork began a rootand-branch rejection of living constitutionalism. Originalism
was a methodology to stop the process of constitutional change
outside the confines of the amendment process. That is a move
of historic significance.
It is not possible to completely separate Bork the scholar
from Bork the Supreme Court nominee whose confirmation the
Senate blocked. But even if that story had an unhappy ending
for the judge and for many others, it tells us something wonderful about great scholarship. His ideas could not be defeated by a
Senate vote.
Antitrust law now goes by his book. While not yet triumphant, originalism is also on the march. In District of Columbia
v Heller,33 the Court extensively inquired into the historical
meaning of the Second Amendment to hold that possessing a

30 See Robin West, ReconstructingLiberty, 59 Tenn L Rev 441, 442-44 (1992).
31 See Griswold, 381 US at 499-500 (Harlan concurring).
32 See id at 500 (Harlan concurring), citing Poe u Ullman, 367 US 497, 553 (1961):
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital
sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when,
having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.
33

554 US 570 (2008).
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handgun in the home was a constitutional right. 34 A measure of
the increasing prevalence of originalism was Justice Stevens's
dissent. He disagreed on the history, but accepted the originalist
methodology.35 Law is about reasons, and Bork very substantially contributed to the reasons that justices can give in their
opinions.
Heller is by no means unique. In the recent case on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 36 the five members of the Court who held that the Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to mandate the purchase
of health insurance relied on a careful reading of the text in its
historical context to conclude that the authority to regulate
commerce could not be understood as the authority to bring
commerce into being.37 And not all of these decisions are politically conservative. For instance, in a series of decisions, the
Court, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, has enforced the Confrontation Clause38 of the Constitution to give criminal defendants
broad rights to cross-examine witnesses.39 Two justices on the
Court, Scalia and Clarence Thomas, are self-proclaimed
originalists.40
In the academy, originalism is also undergoing a revival.
Originalism may be the most discussed idea in constitutional
theory. And the discussion does not stop at the theoretical level.
Many leading law reviews publish thoroughly researched historical analyses of specific provisions of the Constitution.41 This
then becomes a transmission belt for moving the law toward the
original meaning of the Constitution. Heller is again a salient
example: the path to the decision was paved by an enormous
amount of scholarship from academics of both the left and right

35
36

See id at 592-95, 598-626.
See id at 640 (Stevens dissenting).
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).

37

See National Federation of Independent Business u Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566,

34

2585-91 (2012) (Roberts). See also id at 2643-44 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
dissenting).
38 US Const Amend VI.
39 See, for example, Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68 (2004).
40 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 862
(1989); Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, Wall Street Journal A19 (Oct
20, 2008).
41 See, for example, William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 Colum L Rev 782, 783-85 (1995); Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 Mich L Rev 547, 552-56 (1999);
Randy E. Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U Chi L Rev 101,
104-05 (2001).
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that argued that the original meaning of the amendment included an individual right to bear arms. Such scholarship and cases
like Crawford v Washington42 show that while originalism was
initially embraced by the right as a principle of decision to resist
living constitutionalism that tended to the left-liberalism, its
power is such that it now enjoys a measure of cross-ideological
appeal.
Thus, while Judge Bork never became Justice Bork, his ideas still move the world, including the justices actually on the
Court. That's the essence of ideas. They can go around political
barriers. They can be like a torrent of water that bears all before
it. They can also seep more slowly into society, mixing with a
substratum of ideas, like the rule of law already in the political
soil, and forever changing it.

42

541 US 36 (2004).
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